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1. Main Debates about Regulation by Incentives  
 
In this paper we introduce a theoretical and conceptual framework to analyse the role of 
monetary and non-monetary incentive schemes in the field of health services and their connections 
to human resources for health policies. The incentives that we will consider can be divided into four 
categories: (1) direct financial incentives; (2) indirect financial incentives; (3), non-financial 
incentives; (4) broader social incentives. Specifically, we stress the relevance of configurations that 
articulate different kinds of incentive conjointly from a bottom up and from a top down perspective.  
 
The paper is divided into two main parts. In the first one we briefly analyse some of the main 
debates about regulation by incentives in local development policies. We focus on the relevance of 
a very local approach to configure incentives schemes. In the second part of the paper we introduce 
the Institutional Analysis and Development framework (IAD) to analyse the impact of a 
configuration of incentives on the functioning of the health care systems. 
 
1.1 The Narrow View 
 
It is interesting to note that the word “incentive” is never quoted in the monumental history of 
economic thought written by Schumpeter (1954). This may seem strange, especially in terms of the 
current economics debate where incentives play a central role. Schumpeter’s omission is easily 
explained when you consider his statement that the main concern of economics’ theorists was the 
theory of value in large economies. It can easily be argued that incentive theories emerge from the 
issue of division of labour and trade, and partly from distribution of work within the family 
(Laffont, Martimort, 2002: 1). The division of labour introduces the problem of delegation, hence 
the consideration about incentives, which can already be found in Adam Smith’s (1776) famous 
thoughts about “sharecropping contracts” in agriculture. Sidgwick also dealt implicitly with the 
issue of incentives in 1883, examining the problems of redistribution. In firm theory, and 
management in particular, Chester Barnard in 1938 was the first to have a broad view of both 
monetary and non-monetary incentives.  
 
In practice, however, the study of incentives developed explicitly and systematically from the 
second half of the 1950s. The initial concept was simple and assumed a high degree of automatism. 
The institution sets the framework for incentives and actors adapt their strategies to the institution’s 
objectives. This can be defined as a narrow view of regulation by incentives. The “narrow” view of 
regulation by incentives assumes rational actors that are able to choose between alternative courses 
of action based on calculation. Therefore, it only considers pay incentives, without acknowledging 
even the potential role of non-pay incentives. Consequently, this narrow view considers one type 
with only three classes: (1) Financial Incentives; (2) Tax Incentives; (3) Real Incentives. Jorgenson 
was the economist who formalised this model using a well-known equation. This is a model that 
provides incentives for social investments. It was conceived in 1963, with a neoclassical 
framework. The expression shows the cost of using capital, whereby it would be advantageous for a 
company to invest until the increase in revenue equals the cost of additional investment. 
 
This narrow view of regulation by incentives has several problems: 
 
1. In the narrow view, the actor reacting to incentives is a Pavlovian actor with a behaviourist 
psychology, just like Pavlov’s famous dog that salivated when subjected to a stimulus and 
reacted predictably, guided by the stimulus. Thus, the actor’s behaviour is easily predictable 
and stereotyped.  
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2. In the narrow view, the context in which the actor operates is banal, where there is one or 
more incentives all having a consistent direction. This context does not provide the actor 
with more powerful or equal and contrasting stimuli. Therefore, the Pavlovian actor’s 
calculations do not involve a check or deadlock situation due to contradictions.  
 
3. The temporal context is not taken into account in the narrow view (there are long-term 
expectations not taken into account by the model). 
 
These problems are closely connected with some assumptions of economic theory, namely 
that: (i) market problems are coordination problems and (ii) information is distributed 
symmetrically and is accessible to everyone. Given that coordination problems are information-
related, point (ii) allows point (i) to be solved. Information is summarized as prices and the price 
system is the tool that allows coordination of individual expectations and interests. 
 
1.2 The Agency Theory 
 
Recently, the Agency Theory, or Principal/Agent Theory, has profoundly renewed the way in 
which regulation by incentives is considered. The Agency Theory is one of the most important 
theories in the current debate in economics. It has profoundly renewed microeconomics by placing 
information, and its role in the operation of a market economy, at the centre of its analytical 
framework, and in particular the interests of financial agents (Laffont, 2003). The Agency Theory 
has attracted some criticism, under points (i) and (ii), as a result of Akerlof’s contributions (1984). 
As Barbera (forthcoming) clearly highlights, point (i) is modified based on the consideration that 
the problems a market economy must face include cooperation problems, namely that actors’ 
interests do not converge and cannot be resolved by more information. That is, there are problems 
relating to motivation and to alignment of interests that are not attributable solely to information 
problems. As stated by Milgrom and Roberts (1994: 257): “(…) if individuals with significant 
information have different interests to those of decision-makers, they may not communicate their 
knowledge fully and accurately.” The criticism of point (ii) also derives from this: information is 
not distributed symmetrically, at most each is better informed than the rest only about his/her own 
actual preferences, abilities and intentions. Consequently, this asymmetry has a decisive role in 
defining economic results.  
 
Solutions proposed by the Agency Theory vary based on two different types of opportunism: 
the first is pre-contractual opportunism (adverse selection) and the second is post-contractual 
opportunism (moral risk).  
 
1. Adverse selection is a problem of pre-contractual opportunism which arises on account of 
private information that clients have prior to stipulating a contract. In the case of adverse 
selection, therefore, the assumption is abandoned of an impersonal market – which is typical 
of a neoclassical model – whereby the characteristics of the population influence the result. 
In this case, the Agency Theory proposes two main solutions: signalling and auto-selection.  
 
a. In the case of signalling, the parties that have private information behave in such a 
way as to show the information they possess. As Filippo Barbera (2000) states, 
educational direction indicates individual productivity. It is assumed that 
productivity requires the same characteristics as good educational direction. 
 
b. Auto-selection relates instead to the activities undertaken by an informed party when 
they discover the other party’s private information. For example, a company that 
wants a low turnover may select potential employees by offering a contract based on 
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a positive relationship between age and salary. Offering initially low salaries that 
increase with age will attract employees that intend or expect to remain in the 
company long-term (ibidem). 
 
2. However, when facing a moral risk the basic problem would be: “(…) a form of post-
contractual opportunism caused by the non-observability of certain actions, which allows the 
individuals charged with carrying them out to pursue their interests at the expense of the 
other party” (Milgrom and Roberts, 1994: 258).  
 
a. If hidden information was a problem in the case of adverse selection, here the 
problem is hidden actions. 
 
b. The Agency Theory suggests that hierarchical control is not a good solution for 
moral risk problems (too costly). It is often better to use incentive contracts that 
align the interests of the principal with those of the agent.  
 
Therefore, the problem with the Agency Theory is balancing the benefits of incentives and the 
costs of the risk. However, the aim is always to have the principal’s interests coincide with those of 
the agent by means of an appropriate incentive plan, using the agent’s interest. Actors must be 
offered incentives to pursue a specific objective that would not otherwise be pursued without an 
incentive plan. But in order to achieve this, it would be sufficient to change the pay-off matrix so 
that the different interests can be aligned. The Agency Theory is applied primarily in the 
organizational field, in terms of designing efficient pay incentives, both in the relationship between 
owners and managers and managers and workers.  
 
In keeping with a “natural” propensity to construct general analytical and deductive theories 
out of context, the Agency Theory was applied to the public regulation processes of the health 
service. In this case, the state is the Principal and the health service is the Agent. The objectives of 
the two actors are in opposition and, in the presence of the conditions described above, the Principal 
is exposed to the opportunism of the agent.  
 
1.3 Is it Possible to Use Agency Theory in Health Sector Regulation? 
 
The Agency Theory provides good heuristic tools in situations where the agent’s opportunism 
is directed at a private asset, but the same does not apply when opportunism is directed at a public 
asset, the use of which cannot be denied. As Filippo Barbera (2000) rightly highlighted very clearly, 
public regulation of local development by means of incentives is almost always connected with the 
production of public goods (sometimes also of common pool resources), and this is certainly true in 
the case of health sector regulation. The state (Principal) has many Agents (healthcare 
organizations), the opportunism of which is the result of a collective action problem1.  
 
Therefore, many significant criticisms of the Agency Theory, principally by sociologists 
(Trigilia, 2002), do not relate solely to its assumptions (e.g. selfish and rational actors, Pavlovian 
actors, little consideration of the contradictory nature of the many incentives that are present in the 
situation, etc.), but also to its scope conditions. The Agency Theory may work where private assets 
are involved, but it is not very promising where public assets are concerned. 
 
                                                
1 As Elinor Ostrom et al. (2002: xiii) say: “a collective-action situation occurs whenever two or more individuals 
associate to produce something of value together, when it would be difficult to produce it alone. Collective-action 
problems occur when a lack of motivation, and/or missing or asymmetric information, generates incentives that prevent 
individuals from satisfactorily resolving a collective-action situation”. 
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Does this mean that incentives have no part to play in the regulation of the health sector? 
Given the criticisms of the Agency Theory, some believe that it is not possible to conceive a 
regulatory model based on incentives for the production of public goods (Barbera, 2000). The 
reasons for a lack of confidence in regulation by means of incentives are based on the significant 
“perverse” effects that are triggered by incentives. The main perverse effects identified by Carlo 
Trigilia (1998, 1999) are: 
 
1) The waste effect, which indicates that the same assumption would have been made 
without assistance. 
 
2) The replacement effect, whereby the incentivized assumption replaces a non-
incentivized assumption in another company. 
 
3) The habit effect, whereby assumptions are made only on the basis of incentives. 
 
4) The selective effect (or “cream skimming effect”), whereby only the most 
competitive people are employed. 
 
We would add a fifth criticism:  
 
5) The automatic nature of incentives, as they are often implemented in the health 
sector, which according to many commentators (and analysts), has prevented the 
nature of selective and targeted interventions. 
 
However, from our point of view, the criticisms described above should not be generalized to 
apply to all regulation by means of incentives, but rather to the way in which it is implemented. In 
other words, regulation by means of incentives as is often used – particularly in the health sector – 
does not affect the institutional context, it is only concerned with reducing costs and does not 
increase the actors’ ability to cooperate. In this case, introducing incentives in the health sector 
would only satisfy short-term political requirements. 
 
Based on a statement made by Barbera (2000, 2001, forthcoming), we would like to 
demonstrate how an appropriate incentive plan is able to take into account the issues raised by 
Trigilia, namely the relationship with the institutional context and the problem of cooperation 
between actors (the dilemmas of collective action). This involves considering the problem of 
incentives from a different viewpoint than that of the Principal/Agent theory.  
 
1.4 Steps to an Institutional Approach  
 
Using a slogan, we could say that if incentives are not sufficient to regulate economic actions, 
then an additional regulation of incentives is required instead (Barbera, 2001). In other terms, 
incentives can only work with appropriate institutional conditions, including trust, social capital, 
interpersonal relations, rules and regulatory and cognitive resources. This “regulationist” theory has 
two variations (Barbera, 2000): the first states that incentives work well with given institutional 
conditions. Here institutions take on a role regulating individual interest and define - but do not 
replace - the structure of constraints and resources with which actors interact (e.g. the relationship 
between institutions and economic development in North). In this sense, “institutions provide the 
incentive structure of an economy and therefore the way they evolve shapes long-run economic 
performance. Institutions, composed of rules, norms of behaviour, and the way they are enforced, 
provide the opportunity set in an economy which determine the kinds of purposeful activity 
embodied in organizations (firms, trade unions, political bodies, and so forth)” (North, 1993: 242). 
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The second version is more radical and states that institutions replace incentives in the actors’ plan 
of action. Here institutions play a constituent role in individual interests (Streeck, 1992). For 
supporters of this second hypothesis, institutions intervene “within an actor’s mind” and modify 
motivational and cognitive components (de Leonardis, 2001). In this sense, providing a collective 
asset (such as healthcare) is not only a function of relevant public incentives, but rather of the 
legislative constraints that exist between the actors. Streeck’s theory highlights two important points: 
(1) as in Granovetter (1985, 2002) and in the new economic sociology in general, the economic 
effects of non-economic motivations and situations come to light; (2) social resources must 
complement economic action, they must be in addition to calculation and not replace it (Barbera, 
forthcoming). However, the main point of current interest in Streeck’s theory is that incentives only 
work with appropriate institutional constraints.  
 
1.5  Collective Incentives 
 
A particularly fruitful way of reformulating the main questions relating to the relationship 
between incentives and the institutional context (social capital / trust / social norms, etc.) is to 
consider that even if incentives are provided to individuals, they are never provided to atomized 
individuals, but rather to individuals who operate in organized groups (such as healthcare 
organizations). This consideration allows questions to be formulated relating to incentive plans that 
are able to favour monitoring and reciprocal sanctioning within a group.  
 
However, we need to introduce a further distinction. In addition to acknowledging that 
individual incentives are aimed at individuals within groups, the relevance of collective incentives 
should also be considered, namely incentives that are a function of the interdependencies within a 
given group and which are capable of sustaining such interdependencies.  
 
The main feature of collective incentives is that of internalizing the free-rider problem within 
the group, thus paving the way for effective solutions such as peer monitoring (Barbera 2002).  
 
In order to examine the relationship between collective incentives and mechanisms that are 
internal to the free-rider control group (specifically social regulations), it should be underlined that 
collective incentives can have very different effects (Heckathorn, 1988):  
 
1) They can encourage monitoring and reciprocal control, thus creating regulations 
internal to the group. 
 
2) They can stimulate collusion, rebellion or deviations towards the external agent. 
 
3) They can create resignation to punishment. 
 
 
   Individual sanction    Intra-group control 
             
    1 
          4  
 
PRINCIPAL  2 
 
   Collective sanction 
   e.g. spill-over from 
   individual sanction 
  AGENT
  
3 
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      MULTI-AGENT GROUP 
 
Figure 1. Adapted from Heckathorn, Broadhead, 1996, p. 239 and from Barbera, 2002, p. 239. 
 
The arrow from the principal to the agent (1) shows the way in which the incentives issue is 
dealt with by the Agency theory. Individual incentives should align the interests of the agent with 
those of the principal, in the presence of information asymmetry. The broken line (3) stylises part of 
the sociological issues summarised above. Where there are strategic interaction problems (multi-
agent group), \ and cognitive resources or institutional regulations provide a decisive contribution to 
processes that regulate the economy. The line that joins the principal to the group, favouring 
internal processes and control (2-3-4), summarises the theoretical direction proposed by Filippo 
Barbera (2002), namely that social resources are essential to initiate cooperative processes, but in 
turn can be stimulated by appropriate policies through collective incentives.  
 
Filippo Barbera (2001) also highlights how the presence of a legitimate system of collective 
incentives produces within the group a regulatory interest in creating norms. Consequently, the 
regulatory/sanctioning system within the group is a “secondary dilemma”. This is because the 
benefits of the system apply to the group as a whole, but creating and maintaining a system of 
regulations is an individual cost and therefore subject to free-riding (Barbera, forthcoming).  
 
In concluding this first part, we believe that the considerations put forward justify maintaining 
the challenge of regulation by incentives. Indeed, using incentives makes the most of the actors in 
the context (they have the information about development possibilities and the local knowledge 
required to activate them) and reduces control costs top-down. At the same time, based on what has 
been discussed, the requirement to pay particular attention to the ways in which incentives are 
actually implemented emerges (Vitale, 2001). In order to do this a conceptual tool kit is required to 
support the analysis of incentive plan implementation processes. We will do this in the second part 
of the paper. 
 
 
2. Rules and Incentives within Health Organizations 
 
In the first part of this paper we established the need to find a framework capable of guiding 
the analysis of the empirical methods of implementing incentive plans in the health sector. From the 
conclusions in part I, we also saw the relevance of the collective dimension of healthcare 
organizations within which incentive programs are implemented. We stated that the incentive 
system within the group is a secondary problem (the appropriateness of opportunism) compared to 
the ways in which regulations are established within the collective. This results in an analytical 
problem: establishing the relevant classes of regulations to analyse the impact of incentives on 
groups.  
 
2.1 Public Health and Local Development 
 
In the first part of this paper, we witnessed how a significant part of the criticism expressed 
towards regulation by incentives is linked to the fact that such incentives are offered without regard 
to the specific context in which they would be given. In direct response to these criticisms, 
approaches to the problems of incentives have been specifically developed to take the individual 
contexts closely into account.  
 
The choice of an approach which takes close account of the conditions in which incentive 
schemes are implemented locally is, nevertheless, fully coherent with the more general challenges 
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faced by health systems in Albania and Serbia-Montenegro. In both of these countries, the processes 
of democratic transition over the past 15 years (despite having come about in completely different 
forms) have provoked wide territorial disparities and inequalities in terms of access not only to 
health care, but also to other fundamental services. Albania, in particular, has experienced a 
polarisation of growth within a relatively narrow belt running between Tirana and Durres, together 
with the deterioration of significant parts of the rural areas (UNDP, 2002: 8). An analysis of the 
indices calculated at the national and regional levels demonstrates that there is a profound regional 
inequality in human development. 
 
On the sanitary level, and despite indications of modest improvements since 1998 (including a 
fall in the infant mortality rate), Albania is still encountering many problems: a growing incidence 
of diseases, a deterioration in living conditions, the dilapidation of health structures, low quality of 
service delivery, and a lack of health specialists due to emigration UNDP, 2002: 25). However, the 
most fundamental problem faced by the health sector is the lack of financial resources. Although 
health spending has recently registered a slight increase, is still falls very much under the average 
European level (2.5% of GDP compared with 7.3% of GDP in 1999). In a chart of financial 
incentives for health professionals in countries of extreme poverty, Albania is shown to have 1.3 
physicians for every 1,000 inhabitants, which is exiguous when compared to the 3 physicians per 
1,000 inhabitants in the European Union, and to the 2.5 physicians per 1,000 in Eastern European 
countries. 
 
Serbia and Albania are both shifting to new payment arrangements from a tradition of public-
sector health delivery in which providers were paid by salary. The economic crises of these two 
countries and the consequent inflation have resulted in an erosion of the value of salaries. Under 
these circumstances, incentives are forced to collaborate or compete with the basic need for 
economic survival (Hicks, Adams 2000: 3). 
 
The main problem in both countries is posed by the migration of competent health staff from 
the mountain areas to urban zones, and more generally, the emigration to other European countries. 
Moreover, the situation in Albania is exacerbated by the government’s difficulty in initiating 
effective processes of decentralisation, thus rather favouring what the UNDP has come to define as 
“a centralised decentralisation” (UNDP 2002: 12-14). 
 
Along with all of this, we are currently witnessing an uncontrolled growth of private practice 
in the health sector, mainly in Albania but to a lesser extent in Serbia. In recent years, 
macroeconomic restructuring has led to a greater role for the market allocation of resources, a 
greater role for the private sector in health care delivery, and also, a greater role for patient 
payments in health finance (Hicks, Adams 2000: 6). Private practice has often received impetus 
from a deterioration of public sector capacity, provoked in turn by low incomes in the health sector. 
Another phenomenon reported has been the formal or informal charging of patients for access to 
public facilities. The increasing privatisation of health care finance and delivery thus involves two 
different kinds of policy dilemmas: (1) the introduction of a market allocation mechanism 
(involving patient fees) often comes into conflict with the government's responsibility to guarantee 
access to medical services for the entire population; (2) the promotion of private sector delivery, 
which is usually concentrated in urban areas, may come into conflict with policies seeking to 
strengthen primary care and rural health systems.  
 
Given this state of events, the local approach to health problems indeed becomes a vital 
necessity. In the specific case of Albania, several international organisations, and the UNDP in 
particular, continually insist on local development. Such insistence is made not only with regard to 
the health sector, but comprehensively as a new vision for the country’s development. This vision 
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represents “first and foremost a novel mentality of government which is needed to meet this 
challenge, a mentality much more attune to local government and to the role of people in 
government than it has been in the past. Closely related to this is the need for a review of existing 
development strategies in order to accommodate the national objectives, together with work on 
selecting priorities for each region, calculating implementation costs and reorienting funding” 
(ibidem: 10). The overall problem therefore seems to be that of fostering autonomous processes of 
local health sector government, capable of mobilising all available resources be they local or 
provided by external donors, as a means to promote participative and purposeful intervention. In 
other words, in order for local health systems to work, a local and participative approach seems 
essential. Without such an approach, reducing territorial inequalities and encouraging innovative 
processes in the most disadvantaged areas remains an impossible task. Local development in these 
countries thus proves to be a fundamental necessity, and the only way to govern areas which are 
considered insignificant with respect to national dynamics and interests. In this sense, the term 
‘local development’ is to be understood as it is often referred to in works on human development, 
that is to say, all the processes of integration between economic and social policies in a given 
territory with a view to improving social quality (Vitale, 2001). 
 
2.2 The Social Quality of Public Health 
 
It is worth dedicating a few words to the term ‘social quality’, a term which has come to 
acquire an ever more precise connotation in the European debate on local development processes. 
The basic definition of ‘social quality’ covers the following four conditions: (a) the existence of 
quality goods and services; (b) protection from social risks; (c) social cohesion; (d) the total 
commitment of one’s capability to participate in society and in relevant public decisions, for the 
total population, that is, for each and every member of the community (Beck, van der Maesen, 
Walker, 1997; de Leonardis, Vitale, 2001). These four basic conditions immediately reveal the 
complexity of the concept of social quality. The concept regards the impact of politics, institutions 
and services on both individual and social welfare conditions, on both the availability of goods to 
meet the needs of individuals and the existence of power and resources for participation in public 
life, in discussions and debates concerning these goods and how they are to be allocated (Beck, van 
der Maesen, Walker, 1997: 297-309; de Leonardis, 2002). In other words, as in the case of health 
services, the parameter of social quality of local development suggests the maxim whereby 
“protection is effective if it means promotion” (de Leonardis, 2004). This implies that health policy 
is not intended to meet health needs, but rather to foster people’s capability to choose and resolve to 
take care of their own well-being and in particular their health (ibidem).2 This requires setting up 
mechanisms for health “co-production”. What this means is that the social quality of local 
development is the result of processes of institutional change and institutional learning, wherein the 
interaction between the actors involved (health staff, but also patients) and the competent authorities 
becomes a continuous reciprocal exchange of top-down and bottom-up communication. This 
process of institutional learning may be defined as a ‘sandwich’, as a means to highlight the fact 
that social quality is the result of reciprocal convergence and feedback (de Leonardis, Vitale, 2001). 
Rather than basing itself on formal completed contracts, this ‘sandwich’ is built on the shared 
responsibility over common projects, a co-responsibility (or co-participation) leaving open the 
capacity for incremental learning (Vitale, 2004). 
 
Therefore, social quality requires vital importance to be given to the analysis of how local 
development policies of health services are to be put into practice. Among the questions that need to 
be asked are which organisations and institutions will implement health policy, how the services are 
                                                
2 Following Amartya Sen (1992), the concept of “need” has acquired a passive connotation with respect to that of 
“capability”. The prospect of positive freedom is closely linked to certain capabilities (e.g.: what a person can do) and 
not to the satisfaction of needs (i.e. what can be done for a person).  
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organised and act on a local level, what relations are established within and among the groups, what 
background habits and what practices are carried out by each one, and so on. Do these habits and 
practices play an active role in the encouragement of, for example, patronage, corruption and 
people's indifference towards their own health? Or, to the contrary, do they look towards generating 
‘empowerment’, to redistributing and generalising capability of choice and action (Sen, 1988), 
participation and co-production of one’s own health (de Leonardis, 2004)? In other words, in order 
to ascertain whether or not a given scheme of incentives could improve the actual quality of the 
outcomes (Hichs, Adams 2000: 13), it is necessary to look on the local level, that is, in the 
specifications of each individual health organisation (understood as a group with its own 
characteristics). At the same time, it is also at local level where innovations in the way of 
coordinating and mobilising actors can arise, with the additional effect of multiplying the resources 
and available capabilities. 
 
The central position of the social quality of local development, with a view to addressing the 
problems of the Albanian and Serbian health systems, allows us to return to the primary thesis of 
this paper: in order to plan incentive schemes for health staff, health policy organisations and 
institutions need to be considered in their day to day activities, in the way they are organised and in 
the general practice that characterises them. Nevertheless, the consideration of the social quality of 
local development provides us with another point for reflection. The task of building generalised 
and impersonal trust together with forms of widespread responsibility is more than a mere problem 
of organisation for local health systems. Building a local context with widespread capabilities is not 
only an organisational problem, but is at the same time a form of incentive, capable in turn of 
motivating and of implicating health workers and officials in the significance and quality of their 
work. In other words, one of the main incentives, which can be offered to health staff, is to try to 
make local contexts work, rather than simply handing out financial incentives. As a matter of fact, 
making local contexts effective entails giving other health personnel a sense of belonging or 
participation. Furthermore, making local contexts work as discussed above implies a highly 
significant investment in the participation of the health workers: granting them an active role in risk 
management and decision making, as well as forming strategic objectives rather than mere 
opportunities, that is to say, involving the staff in the overall design of the dynamics of local 
development. 
 
Given these preliminary indications, we have decided to outline an analytical framework with 
the following two capabilities: firstly, to take all observations of this paper into account and thus to 
focus attention on the local specifications, on the individual organisational contexts within which 
the incentive schemes are decided and implemented; and secondly, to value not only the financial 
incentives but also diverse types of non-monetary incentives, capable nonetheless of supporting the 
commitment of health staff to their particular area. In short, we may state that in order to define an 
analytical framework for our research, we have asked ourselves whether the knowledge of the 
context in which the incentives are implemented is as important as, if not more important than, the 
nature of the incentives themselves. As held by Hicks and Adams (2000: 12): “Incentives seldom 
exist in isolation, and the policy context in which they exist may be as important as the incentive 
itself in affecting behaviour”. 
 
This is a problem that obliges us to turn to the framework developed by the Workshop in 
Political Theory and Policy Analysis, under the direction of Elinor Ostrom and Michael McGinnis, 
i.e. the Institutional Analysis and Development framework (IAD). The IAD framework develops an 
extensive analytical vocabulary for the study of collective action dilemmas. In the IAD, collective 
action is central to the problem of incentive regulation. In institutional analysis, one uses the term 
“incentive” to refer to rewards and punishments that are perceived by individuals to be related to 
their actions and those of others: “the payments people receive or costs they have to pay, the respect 
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they earn from others, the acquisition of new skills or knowledge are all external stimuli that may 
induce more of some kinds of behaviour and less of other kinds” (Ostrom E. et al., 2002: 6). The 
incentive structure that impacts a group is filtered by the set of regulations adopted by each group. 
The types of regulations are universal and their specification is infinitely varied, whereby it is only 
possible to study the differences between groups relationally, within a substantially structuralist 
approach. 
 
2.3 The Institutional Analysis and Development Framework 
 
The IAD was developed reflecting on two very different research programs: (1) common-pool 
resources, e.g. management of groundwater, irrigation systems, forestry resources and fisheries, 
typically by local groups (McGinnis 1999b); and (2) local public economies and public health 
services (McGinnis 1999a). 
  
The research programs conducted by Workshop-affiliated scholars must be seen in the context 
of other studies of institutions as crucial links between political and economic phenomena. 
Institutional analysis initially began as a variant of public choice. In early works public choice was 
the preferred term used by the founders of the Workshop (e.g., Ostrom E., Ostrom V., 1971). 
Mitchell (1988) argues that the IAD framework differs from the other public choice tradition in its 
reliance on inductive empirical research rather than the development of formal models per se. 
Another major difference is that the work of Herbert Simon on public administration and on the 
cognitive limitations of human rationality had a major influence on institutional analysis. The 
following three points summarize aspects of institutional analysis that differentiate it from these 
other approaches to the study of institutions (McGinnis, 1999c).  
 
1. No one institution or set of actors can be totally understood in isolation. 
Institutional analysts must consider the ways in which actor preferences are shaped by their 
institutional roles, which in turn result from processes in other arenas of choice. In this 
sense, all institutionalized interactions are instances of polycentric games (McGinnis, 2000). 
The essential defining characteristic of a polycentric policy system is one where “many 
officials and decision structures are assigned limited and relatively autonomous prerogatives 
to determine, enforce and alter legal relationships” (Ostrom V., 1999: 55). This implies the 
absence in a polycentric system of any simple one-to-one correspondence between 
categories of goods, property rights, and owner-bodies-organizational entities. 
 
2. All successful organizations require effective procedures for monitoring and 
sanctioning. “This holds true even for small, homogeneous groups. Even groups with a 
strong sense of a shared community of understanding cannot neglect questions of 
monitoring the behaviour of individuals (both members and agents) and the sanctioning of 
rule violators” (McGinnis, 1999c: 5).  
 
3. Co-production involves direct participation in the production of a collective 
good by those who will benefit from its production. This term denotes an alternative to the 
standard conceptualization of production and consumption as totally separate activities. In 
co-production, the quality of a good can be enhanced if consumers are directly involved in 
the production of that good. In regular production consumers and producers engage in 
simple exchange. This concept was originally developed in the study of neighbourhood 
security and other local public goods (Parks et al., 1981; McGinnis, 1999b). It has 
subsequently been applied to sustainable development (Ostrom E., 1996; McGinnis, 1999a) 
and it has important implication in the health sector (Vitale, 2004).  
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The implications of institutions for individual behaviour and policy outcomes can best be 
understood by careful examination of particular empirical contexts, but such detailed analyses are 
most effective if they are informed by an overarching framework of analysis. The IAD framework 
provides a common set of concepts and analytical categories that can be applied to a broad array of 
empirical contexts. This framework elaborates upon the theoretical foundations of methodological 
individualism, and the components of this framework can be used to craft detailed models 
appropriate for different settings. 
 
2.4 The Action Arena 
 
The IAD framework highlights the importance of understanding the behaviour of actors as 
occurring within action arena. Whenever two or more individuals are faced with a set of potential 
actions that jointly produce outcomes, these individuals can be said to be in an action arena, as in 
team work within health organizations. The concept of action arena is currently used in different 
approach in social sciences to analyze and explain actions and mechanisms within both formal and 
informal institutional arrangements (Cefaï, 2002). In the IAD framework, apart from focusing only 
on one arena and taking the variables specifying the situation and the motivational and cognitive 
structure of an actor as given, this approach stresses two additional steps in the level of analysis 
(Ostrom, Gardner, Walker 1994). One step digs deeper and inquires into the factors that affect the 
structure of an action arena. From this vantage point, the action arena is viewed as a set of variables 
dependent upon other factors. These factors affecting the structure of an action arena include three 
clusters of variables: “(1) the rules used by participants to order their relationships, (2) the attributes 
of states of the world that are acted upon in these arenas, and (3) the structure of the more general 
community within which any particular arena is placed” (Ostrom E., Ostrom V., 2004: 116). The 
second step helps move outward from action arenas to consider methods for explaining complex 
structures that link sequential and simultaneous action arenas to one another (Ostrom, Walker, 
1997). So, action situations are defined by different configurations of physical conditions, attributes 
of the community, and the rules-in-use, which are in turn differentiated among the operational, 
collective, and constitutional arenas of choice (typically referred to as levels of analysis). 
Institutional development refers to the ways institutional arrangements change, in interaction with 
changes in physical conditions, individual behaviour, and cultural understandings. 
 
 
Figure 2. The IAD Framework 
 
The IAD has allowed the explanation of various mechanisms that recur in diverse ‘action 
situations’, understood as dependent variables. The structure of all of these situations — and many 
more — can be described and analyzed by using a common set of variables or working parts: (1) the 
set of participants, (2) the specific positions to be filled by participants, (3) the potential outcomes, 
(4) the set of allowable actions and the function that maps actions into realized outcomes, (5) the 
control that an individual has in regard to this function, (6) the information available to participants 
about the structure of the action situation, and (7) the costs and benefits—which serve as incentives 
and deterrents—assigned to actions and outcomes (see Ostrom, Gardner, and Walker, 1994; Ostrom 
E., 1999a, forthcoming).  
 
So, the IAD framework is an extensive body of political, social, and economic theory that focuses 
on the impact of diverse rules on the incentives, behaviour, and likely outcomes within different 
settings. It permits the undertaking of an analysis of how combinations of rules, the structure of the 
goods and technology involved, and culture interact to affect the incentives facing individuals and 
resulting patterns of interactions adopted by individuals. As Elinor Ostrom et al. (2002: xiii) say: “a 
successful approach to the problem of development must focus on how to generate appropriate 
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incentives so that the time, skill, knowledge, and genuine effort of multiple individuals are 
channelled in ways that produce jointly valued outcomes”. 
 
In the IAD these “individuals” are fallible learners (Ostrom V., 1987) that can, and often do, 
make mistakes. “Whether incentives encourage people to learn from these mistakes, or to continue 
to make the same mistakes forever, depends on the particular institutional settings. And, whether 
incentives encourage the adoption of a reputation for being reliable and trustworthy or the seeking 
out of short-term benefits without taking into account the effect on longer –term patterns of 
interaction, also depend largely on the rules structuring particular situations” (Ostrom et al., 2002: 
279). 
 
2.5 The Normative Dimension of an Action Arena 
 
The IAD categorizes rules into three analytical levels to determine influential variables. The 
three levels are constitutional, collective, and operational (see Figure 3). The constitutional-choice 
level rules determine the overarching rule environment (i.e., who has the power to make rules about 
the rules). It is a stage of “epistemic choice” (Ostrom V., 1993, de Leonardis 2001: 127-9; Ostrom 
E., Ostrom V. 2004: 133), where actors discuss criteria, vocabularies, of analyzing and judging and 
discovering new possibilities. The constitutional-choice level connects to the second level of rules 
(collective-choice) through the implementation of the constitution and its enforcement. The 
collective-choice rules create the decision-making environment within the organization. The third 
level of rules, operational-choice, governs the day-to-day operations of a health agency. Outcomes 
of operational-choice level decisions are goods produced or services delivered. Since services are 
delivered and goods are produced at the operational-level, it is this level where quality is ultimately 
determined (Bushouse, 1999). In the IAD framework, the levels of rules are nested (Ostrom E., 
1999a). Nesting means that the rule decisions determined at one level create the rules-in-use at the 
next level. Thus, the operational choice level rules are nested within the collective-choice level 
rules, which are nested within the constitutional-choice level. The implication of this is that 
constitutional rules do have an impact at the operational-choice level. But, the impact of a 
constitutional-choice rule must first be understood in relation to its impact on collective-choice 
level rules before any conclusions can be drawn about its impact on outcomes at the operational 
choice level (Bushouse, 1999; Ostrom E., Ostrom V., 2004).  
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Figure 3. Different Levels of Action Situations 
 
One of the reasons why we find the IAD framework particularly interesting is connected with the 
ways in which the normative dimension is conceptualized by institutions (Crawford, Ostrom, 1995):  
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(a) Rules are shared understandings among those involved that refer to enforced prescriptions 
about what actions (or states of the world) are required, prohibited, or permitted. All rules 
are the result of implicit or explicit efforts to achieve order and predictability among humans 
by creating classes of persons (positions) who are then required, permitted, or forbidden to 
take classes of actions in relation to required, permitted, or forbidden states of the world 
(Crawford, Ostrom 1995; Ostrom V., 1991).  
 
(b) Norms are shared and internalized understandings by those involved about the “do’s and 
don’ts” involved in particular types of situations. “In contrast to rules that are generally 
enforced, norms are usually not enforced in a regular way by designated agents. Individuals 
involved in situations with participants who do not follow group norms may gossip about 
each other and refuse to engage in reciprocity with those who break norms. When rules are 
accepted as norms in a community, someone who breaks a rule faces a high likelihood of 
receiving both formal sanctions as well as various forms of disapproval extended to them by 
others in the group” (Ostrom E. et al., 2002: 5).  
 
(c) Strategies are the plans for action that individuals make within a structure of incentives 
produced by rules, physical goods, and attributes of a community; “the consequent 
expectations that an individual has of the likely behaviour of others; and the perceptions of 
likely benefits or costs they may receive or pay in light of actions and outcomes” (ibidem). 
 
Obviously, the regulations that apply in one situation do not provide in themselves an 
acceptable explanation of the structure of the “situation”. As we have seen, socio-economic factors 
(the “attributes of a community”), as well as physical and material conditions, are important 
variables too. Within a particular action situation, individuals can only attempt to choose in light of 
their beliefs about the opportunities and constraints of that situation.  
 
In a longer-run view, “individuals may be able to affect the structure of operational action 
situations in which they repeatedly find themselves by changing the rule configurations affecting 
the structure of these situations. To do so, they move up an analytical level to a “collective-choice” 
or “constitutional-choice” action situation where the outcomes generated are changes in the rules of 
lower-level action situations. If one wants to change the behaviour of individuals interacting in a 
situation, one method is to change one or more of these working parts. One way of beginning to 
understand this process is to ask about the rules that affect each of the working parts of an action 
situation” (Ostrom E., 2004: 4-5). These are displayed around the outside of the circle of Figure 4. 
It is, of course, possible to generate a particular action situation using a variety of rules, goods, and 
community attributes.  
 
 
Figure 4. Source: Ostrom E., forthcoming 
 
The task is to try to understand who the actors are, how they came to be in this situation, and 
the characteristics that they share (or do not share) that affect their perceptions of the situation and 
each other. In addition to understanding the actions they can take and how these are linked to 
outcomes, it is important to pay particular attention to the information available to actors (in terms 
of completeness and distribution) and to the benefits and costs assigned to different actions.  
 
2.6 Linking Rules and Incentives 
 
The IAD considers relational, organizational and process interdependence of great 
importance, but it does not identify any process variables. Each local situation can be analyzed 
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using the process variables that a researcher chooses to select from the social theory that s/he 
considers appropriate. There are no general process variables, otherwise the approach would 
become one big structural / functionalist theory. The IAD is an analytical framework and not an 
explanatory one. It provides direction on how to observe the impact of incentives on action 
situations by the configuration of classes of rules. In other words, it basically says that there is no 
correlation between a rule and collective performance. There are only very local configurations 
(hyper-local approach)3. It is the configuration of each group’s rules that allows the group to 
perceive incentives in a different way. The aim of this analytical conceptualization is trying to 
understand the structure of the situation as viewed by the participants. All the structural working 
parts of a configuration enter into the perception of incentives by actors. It is the identification of 
the perceived incentives that leads the analyst to generate hypotheses about expected patterns of 
interactions and resulting outcomes (Ostrom E. et al., 2002: 299).  
 
One recent fundamental theoretical development of the IAD is the identification of the 
working parts of rules (Ostrom E., 2004; forthcoming). As Elinor Ostrom wrote, “until we develop 
an analytical scheme for identifying rules we are stuck with the unsatisfactory language of broad 
general institutional types such as markets, governments, and private property” (Ostrom E., 2004: 
5). Ostrom clusters generic types of rules according to which component of an action situation the 
rule directly affects (a rule may affect other working parts of an action situation as a secondary 
effect). This leads to the identification of seven broad groupings of rules: position rules, boundary 
rules, authority rules, aggregation rules, scope rules, information rules, and payoff rules. 
 
“Boundary rules affect how individuals are assigned to or leave positions and how one situation 
is linked to other situations. Authority rules affect the assignment of particular action sets to 
positions. Aggregation rules affect the level of control that individual participants exercise at a 
linkage within or across situations. Scope rules affect which outcomes may, must, or must not 
be affected within a domain. Information rules affect the level of information available in a 
situation about actions and the link between actions and outcome linkages. Payoff rules affect 
the benefits and costs assigned to outcomes given the actions chosen. If a prescription is a rule 
rather than being a norm that individuals in the situation share, some payoff rule must exist that 
adds sanctioning costs when a rule is broken and the action situation is linked to a second 
situation involving the monitoring of rule conformance in the initial situation” (ibidem, 2004: 
6).    
 
In this framework, it is possible to see how to affect the attributes of members of an action 
situation through boundary rules, how to affect the set of allowable actions through creating position 
rules and through authority rules, while outcomes are affected through payoff rules and through 
changes in information, scope, and aggregation rules (Ostrom E., 1999b: 508-519). To better 
understand the classification of rules, we will follow the consideration of Ostrom E. et al. (2002: 
291-293), as developed later by Elinor Ostrom (2004; forthcoming) to focus on a series of questions 
that are intended to help the analyst get at the rules-in-use that help structure a situation.  
 
Boundary rules affect the number of actors, their attributes and resources, whether they can 
enter freely in the action situation, and the conditions they face for leaving. They are Entry and Exit 
rules and Positions rules. Entry and Exit rules affect the characteristics of the participants. Who are 
the users of the local health service? Are the users limited to local residents; to one group defined 
by ethnicity, race, caste, gender, or family structure; to those who win a lottery; to those who have 
obtained a permit; or in some other way limited to a class of individuals that is bounded? Is a new 
actor allowed to join a group by some kinds of entry fee or initiation? And what about the health 
                                                
3 The set of working rules is a configuration also in the sense that the effect of a change in one rule may depend upon 
the other rules-in-use (Ostrom, forthcoming). 
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workers (same kind of questions)? Position rules establish positions of participants in the action 
situation and differentially affect the capabilities and responsibilities of those participants in 
positions. A typical question is how does an actor move from being just a “member” of a group to 
someone who has a specialized task? 
 
Authority rules assign sets of actions that actors in positions at particular nodes must, may, or 
may not take. Authority rules, combined with scientific cause and effect relationship of the world 
being acted upon, determine the shape of the decision tree – the action-outcome linkages. What 
understandings do users/workers have about mandatory, authorized, or forbidden health 
technologies? What choices do various types of monitors have related to the actions they can take? 
 
Payoff rules affect the benefits and costs that will be assigned to particular combinations of 
actions and outcomes and establish the objective benefits and costs of action. These expected, 
objective benefits are perceived by actors as incentives or deterrents. Looking back at more than 30 
years of research on common pool resources, three broad types of payoff rules are identified:  (1) 
the imposition of a fine, (2) the loss of rights to access, and (3) incarceration.  The severity of each 
of these types of sanctions can range from very low to very high and tends to start out on the low 
end of the scale.  Boundary and authority rules also affect how easy or difficult it is to monitor 
activities and impose sanctions on rule infractions.  How large are the sanctions that can be 
enforced for breaking any of the rules identified above? How is conformance to rules monitored? 
Who is responsible for sanctioning non-conformers? How reliably are sanctions enforced? Are there 
any positive rewards offered to appropriators for any actions they can take? (E.g., is someone who 
is an elected official relieved of labour duties?) 
 
Information rules affect the knowledge-contingent information sets of actors, they affect the 
kind of information present or absent in a situation. Every health organization vary radically in 
regard to the mandatory information that they require.  Many smaller and informal health unit rely 
entirely on a voluntary exchange of information and on mutual monitoring.  Where the size of the 
health organization is larger, more and more requirements are added regarding the information that 
must be kept by health workers or their officials.  A typical question is what information must be 
held secret and what information must be made public? 
 
Scope rules delimit the potential outcomes that can be affected and working backwards, the 
actions linked to specific outcomes. In other words, scope rules affect the outcomes that are 
allowed, mandated, or forbidden. What understandings do the users and workers have about the 
authorized or forbidden functional domains? Do any maps exist showing who can do what? Are 
there understandings about interventions that are “off-limit”? 
 
Aggregation rules affect the level of control that an actor in a position exercises in the 
selection of an action at a node. This means that aggregation rules affect how individual actions are 
transformed into final outcomes. Aggregation rules are used extensively in collective-choice 
processes and less extensively in operational settings, but one aggregation rule that is found in 
diverse systems is a requirement that health activities be done in teams.  This increases the 
opportunity for mutual monitoring and affect the type of non-pay incentives that are relevant. What 
understandings exist concerning the rules affecting the choice of health activities? Must certain 
actions require permission from, or agreement of, others prior to taking the action? 
 
 
AIM Most General Verb Type of Rule 
Positions To Hold Position 
Participants To Enter or to Leave Entry and exit 
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Actions To Do Authority 
Control To Jointly affect Aggregation 
Outcomes To Occur Scope 
Information To Send or to Receive Information 
Costs/Benefits To Pay or to Receive Payoff 
 
Chart 1. Source: Ostrom E., forthcoming. 
 
 
One problem is that many rules-in-use are not written down. Many of the rules-in-use are not 
even conceptualized by participants as rules. “In settings where the rules-in-use have evolved over 
long periods of time and are understood implicitly by participants, obtaining information about 
rules-in–use requires spending time in a site and learning how to ask non-threatening, context-
specific questions about rule configurations” (Ostrom E. et al., 2002: 293). 
 
The direct relationships among rules and the components of an action situation is shown in 
Figure 4 as the set of arrows connecting rules to specific parts of an action situation. Obviously, the 
diagram in Figure 4 shows enormous complexity that cannot easily be supported in a single 
empirical study. However, at the same time, it seems to provide an overall view as to how the 
incentive structure affects actors’ strategies.  
 
Therefore, the essential point is that incentives do not align atomized and Pavlovian actors in a 
banal way. They work in directions that are similar (but never coincident) to those of the principal 
when they impact a collective where there is trust and reciprocity, and if the collective is able to 
intervene actively in its constituent rules. In addition, the incentives do not destroy the capacity for 
collective action, but rather they reinforce and support cooperation. Incentives will only produce 
results when all of these conditions have been met. 
 
It is therefore possible to provide incentives using this approach, as long as there is a thorough 
understanding of the combination of rules being used in each specific context. One of the main 
messages of this approach is that it is not enough to shower money on an action situation.  
 
2.7 Trust, Cooperation and Non-Pay Incentives 
 
The approach we have described seems particularly useful and productive to analyze the 
regulation through incentives of healthcare organizations in countries having contradictory and 
paradoxical economic development. In this sense, the approach we chose for this paper is related to 
the types of countries in which the second stage of the research will be carried out: the empirical 
analysis of the healthcare systems in Serbia and Albania. The theoretical framework we have 
chosen shows the importance of closely analyzing the rules that are in force in each organization. 
Healthcare organizations are considered single action arena, each having its own specific rules. The 
IAD framework highlights how the cognitive method through which actors apply the incentive 
structure in an organization has a normative basis, that is a specific configuration of rules that 
govern the life of the group in question. The implementation of an incentive plan in a healthcare 
organization is perceived in different ways according to the configuration of rules that characterize 
the organization, as an action arena for individual workers. Before designing and implementing 
incentive plans from the top for a healthcare organization, the IAD framework reminds us that the 
regulations must be analyzed accurately, as individual incentives are not important in themselves, 
for their content, but rather for their configuration in relation to the structure of rules in the action 
situation that they will impact. In addition, the incentives of actors are shaped by institutional 
arrangements, and it is not always the case that the actors incorporate these incentives into their 
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goal structure in exactly the manner that the original designers intended. “Instead, individuals 
respond creatively to their changed circumstances, oftentimes creating consequences that may not 
have been foreseen by those involved in the design process” (McGinnis, 2003: 2). 
 
In this sense, it is not possible to design incentive plans that are universally valid for all 
healthcare organizations, as each healthcare organization is a specific situation that reacts to 
incentives based on its specific structure of internal rules. This very local approach, far from 
discouraging investment in regulation through incentives, actually leads to attention being focused 
on individual beneficiary organizations and on the implementation process. At the same time, the 
connection between rules and incentives shows how it is not only financial incentives that allow the 
objectives of healthcare organizations to be directed. A basic requirement for healthcare 
organizations is to be characterized by a high level of trust, above all internally, but also in terms of 
the external context.  
 
Particularly in contexts such as Eastern European countries, where healthcare operators are 
paid very low salaries and tend to emigrate to richer Western European countries, cooperation 
incentives are essential to enhance employee commitment through greater involvement at all levels. 
Therefore, it is important to understand how to be successful in creating an internal organizational 
environment that encourages cooperation among staff members to solve collective action problems. 
 
It could be said that, instead of regulation by incentives, it would be sufficient to improve the 
control of governments, trying to oblige the commitment of health workers in a true Leviathan 
style. But we know that if the focus of government is too much on control, it crowds out 
investments in social capital and trust, it creates incentives to evade government regulations, and it 
is counter-productive in general (Ostrom V., 1997).  
 
Similarly, it could be said that the preferable route is that of using financial incentives, both 
direct (with a higher level of pensions, or new insurances, or clothing / accommodation / travel / 
childcare allowance), or indirect (such as subsidized meals / clothing / accommodation / transport or 
childcare subsidies).  
 
But neither of these options appears to be fully satisfactory. We are dealing with countries 
where health policies tend to be characterized by a marked difficulty in increasing health 
expenditure. Indeed, they tend to reduce health expenditure in favour of expanding a private market. 
In these contexts, rationalization and limiting waste and corruption are undoubtedly important and 
central, but they are typically not enough to find the necessary resources to provide substantial 
regulation through financial incentives. Therefore, in these contexts it is essential to involve the 
health operator in his/her organization. Regulation by non-financial incentives may encourage 
reciprocity and trust between colleagues, thus increasing cooperation. It may also encourage quality 
of work, by encouraging participation in the decision-making process within the organization and in 
some of the strategic objectives, but also by rotating functions and tasks, as well as flexibility of 
working hours and firmly rooting the healthcare institution within the territory (encouraging a 
closer link with local communities).  
 
In addition, non-financial incentives include forms of support and incentives for teamwork, 
which are very important to maintain good levels of commitment and loyalty. And as Keser (2002) 
shows, voluntary teaming increases team effort with respect to enforced teaming. Axelrod (1984) 
defined reciprocity in terms of behaviour without reference to preferences: cooperation is 
reciprocated with cooperation and defection is reciprocated with defection. This implies that it is 
not only important to change the order of preferences of people within an organization, but to 
change the style of work to obtain trust. And this is a typical role for non-financial incentives. Non-
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financial incentives could also sustain new management control strategies seek to involve the 
workers. Also task discretion does appear to be a significant factor for employees (Gallie, 2003). 
Finally, non-monetary incentives may support individual agencies, cooperation between operators 
(Tendler, 1997: 21-45), redefining roles and providing symbolic recognition (social status, social 
respect and self-respect), more intense trade and training activities.  
 
Non-pay incentives are essential incentives, as they allow the creation of non-consequentialist 
motivations (Granovetter, 2002) and a kind of “serial equity” (Ouchi, 1980) that allows actors to 
continue cooperating, remaining in their positions even though it would be in their immediate 
interests not to do this and leave. As Filippo Barbera (2001: 447) reminds us, “In order to undertake 
cooperative processes, actors must have consideration as well as a lengthy orientation period. 
Actors must be able to stop rational calculation and act as if incentives were aligned and 
cooperation were always advantageous: “Trust begins (...) by acting as if we are trusting, at least 
until more stable convictions are formed on a more solid base” (Gambetta, 1989: 305)”. It is this 
very connection between the normative aspect of health organizations and regulation through 
incentives, as we have seen, which is central to the IAD framework.  
 
2.8 Regulation by Incentives and Outcomes Changing 
 
In our judgement this is really a major analytical result. It permits to understand better if and 
how incentives could change health sector outcomes. The structural connection between normative 
aspect of health organizations and regulation by incentives help us to analyse feasible changing in 
health agencies. It is obviously rather difficult for change to come about, especially in critical 
situations where obstacles and habitual inertia make the problems impossible to solve and 
exacerbate the already chronic effects. In this sense, the desire for change is not enough: in fact, the 
framework we have chosen strongly reminds us that the intention of a single actor is not enough, 
nor even his or her rationality or capability. Just as change cannot come about by means of a pre-
designed plan, well-defined objectives together with an appropriate calculation of the relationship 
between means and ends are not enough. As the IAD framework emphasizes above all else, it is 
necessary to be aware of the different set of rules, which characterises the context of local 
organisation. Resistance to change, linked to the rules that characterise the particular health 
authority, needs to be fully explored. Such resistance to change forms an integral part of collected 
and shared ways of understanding and of working. Moreover, these practices indeed enjoy a strong 
normative power: what is thought and done matches what must in fact be thought and done. This 
situation, which rests on a long-settled body of rules, often seems to be the only possible option, 
whereby resources always appear to be dramatically scarce, and one finds himself thinking only in 
terms of what lacks and not in terms of potential actions to bring change, improvement and learning 
(Hirschman, 1971). In this sense, change in health organisations is only possible where the situation 
and the common feeling with respect to the situation, rules and preferences are successfully turned 
around.  
 
This is a very important hypothesis for National Regulative Health Agencies (especially for 
Health Ministers), but also for external donors offering pay and non-pay incentives to health 
organizations in Albania and in Yugoslavia. Also it is very important for donors to take into account 
the particular structure of rules of each health organization, before deciding how recurring to an 
incentives schema. Research literature using the IAD framework to analyse development 
cooperation (e. g.: Gibson et al., forthcoming) clearly underlines the relevance for donors to provide 
incentives for organizational learning about the long term sustainability of workers commitment. 
Much of the literature on incentives in development assistance focuses on conditionality – that is, 
how aid can be used as a carrot and stick to modify recipient behaviour. This literature deals mainly 
with the relationship between the donor and recipient governments. Gibson et al. underline that 
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incentives in the context of aid are based more broadly and deeply. Against the underpinnings of 
this well-explored interpretation of aid as an incentive, they sustain the idea that the characteristics 
and modality of aid carry rule properties that, within specific configurations, take on particular 
institutional significance. They stress the main rule implications of different modalities of aid 
(grants, credits, and guarantees as well as tied-aid). And they note that “these rule properties interact 
with institutional realities faced by beneficiaries. Sustainable benefits from development assistance 
can emerge only when the structure of aid helps align incentives to extant problems of collective 
action” (Ostrom E. et al., 2002: 89). So, a more explicit and systematic understanding of rules’ 
configuration and the incentives that emerge within particular health organizational structures, “as 
well as mechanisms for transmitting this knowledge” (ibidem: 240), are therefore crucial to improve 
donor’s mission effectiveness.  
 
From the IAD framework, we understand that it is important to investigate if and how 
incentives are able to direct the inertia, which characterises and oppresses the health organisations 
in a different manner. Thanks to the IAD framework, we make the hypothesis that directing inertia 
can only be made possible through this joint work on the normative and cognitive structure of each 
single organisation. Strategic reasoning and intention is thus far from enough (Boltanski, 2002), and 
it is very necessary to give weight to the capacity to reflect and learn throughout the work (De 
Leonardis, 2002). To achieve this objective, again there are no recipes, but the preferences of the 
actors involved and their changes could be used as a means to spur the work. Integrating, relocating, 
and creating a plurality of contrasting experiences and viewpoints would also be extremely useful, 
without losing track of the need to produce tangible, visible results which can be shared by all, and 
which can provoke a change in perspective (both the situation and the way it is seen) by virtue of 
their very existence.  
 
To briefly conclude we can summarize saying that the IAD framework directs our attention 
not only on the contents of an incentive scheme for health workers (e. g.: financial or non-financial 
motives), and not generically on the context where this scheme has to be implemented. It allows us 
“to put beneficiaries first”: the tools of the IAD framework focus the analysis “on the institutional 
change that will be required to allow beneficiaries to overcome their collective-action problems and 
realize their own developmental potential” (Ostrom E. et al., 2002: 250). 
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